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Abstract 
It is a widely used assumption in the literature on political decision-
making that leaders ‘choose their battles’ according to their interests. 
This strategic approach often results in seemingly ‘fake crises’; crises 
which are – as opposed to natural disasters – not exogenous in nature. 
These crises are exceptional in that they are avoidable and are the 
product of political entrepreneurs following deliberate agendas. In this 
paper, the logic of crisis manufacturing is illustrated by a case study of 
the ‘fiscal wars’ of 2011–2013. The case study shows how, given the 
right institutional environment, political entrepreneurs, even those 
outside the political mainstream, can use crisis manufacturing to their 
advantage. In order to exploit the institutional veto points related to 
fiscal policy in the U.S. constitutional system, various actors associated 
with the Republican Party and the Tea Party movement used a 
networked, coalition-based approach to reach these goals. Although 
their quest to instill a regime of fiscal conservatism was eventually 
unsuccessful, they did manage to raise their national profile and set 
the policy agenda for an extended period. 
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1. Introduction
1
 
 
The sources of policy crises are well-studied in contemporary policy studies, 
and rightly so. Depending on their nature, policy crises involve significant losses in 
terms of human lives (as in the case of disasters or armed conflict) or economic value 
(as in the case of financial meltdowns, for example). The analysis of the root causes of 
crises, therefore, is a natural preoccupation for policy researchers.  
Policy crises come in two major types: those which are exogenous, and those 
which are endogenous in nature. Whereas exogenous shocks tend to lead students of 
public policy towards the global context – e.g., to seismology in the case of tsunami 
prediction –, crises with endogenous causes highlight the role of political actors and 
institutions. Endogeneity – here defined by the condition that the impetus for the 
crisis comes from inside the realm of the political system – may still be the 
unpredictable outcome of unintended acts.  
But, at least in some cases, crisis stems from the premeditated deeds of the 
political class. The logic of these manufactured crises – to borrow a term used by 
Porter (2014), among others – is distinct from those initiated by exogenous causes, 
and also from those of the ‘unintended’ subclass of the endogenous kind. We rely on 
multiple strands in the literature to delineate a theoretical framework for describing 
the logic of manufactured crisis. The former include works related to institutional 
change, political entrepreneurship, U.S. fiscal policy (see ‘fiscal cliff’) and the study of 
the public policy of American conservatism and the Tea Party. 
In this article the logic of manufactured crisis is explored through outcome-
centric research (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 184). As opposed to 
inductive research aimed at generalization from a sample, the focus of the former is 
internal validity as it develops a causal link between independent political factors and 
dependent policy variables. That said, as the theoretical framework matures over 
prospective studies, questions of external validity may once again come to the fore (we 
discuss a few of these in the Discussion). 
Our case of choice concerns the role the Tea Party movement played in the 
U.S. debt ceiling crisis of the early 2010s. This episode in U.S. policy history seems 
particularly suitable for an outcome-based study of the logic of manufactured crises. 
First, it was clearly an endogenous crisis: opponents of public debt accumulation 
would not have had much leverage over other political actors except for exploiting the 
debt ceiling. In this it represents an exemplary case of a ‘man-made’ disaster in 
waiting, as nothing separated calamity from normalcy except for a simple vote (as 
occurred on a number of previous occasions).  
Moreover, the debt ceiling debate offers a natural case for the study of the role 
of political entrepreneurship in crisis-manufacturing as a distinctive set of players 
played an active part in fomenting the crisis – the Tea Party movement and its 
congressional allies. The subject of the debate is equally suitable for our purposes. 
The high-stakes negotiations surrounding the debt ceiling created a real-life ticking 
bomb scenario, in which a potential shortcut to massive political capital accumulation 
was matched with correspondingly high political risk.  
                                                        
1
 I am thankful for comments by Gábor Győri and two anonymous reviewers. Any errors that remain are 
my sole responsibility. 
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In the given settings, all the major components of a major endogenous policy 
crisis were at play: political entrepreneurs striving for a return on political investment; 
easily removable institutional constraints; a high-risk, high-reward environment, and a 
firmly defined timetable for the negotiations to unfold. In light of these features, the 
Tea Party maneuvering regarding the debt ceiling promised to be a classic case of 
manufactured crisis.  
In what follows, an overview is first provided of the literature on the 
endogenous causes of crises in general, and the role of political entrepreneurs in 
particular. Second, we discuss the rationale for case selection. Third, an empirical case 
study is presented of the fiscal wars of 2011–2013 with an emphasis on how the logic 
of crisis-manufacturing unfolded in the strategic moves of the political leaders of the 
Tea Party movement. A discussion of the theoretical relevance of the networked, 
coalition-based strategy of the Tea Party follows, along with considerations related to 
the external validity of the proposed framework. The final section recapitulates and 
considers avenues for further research.  
 
2. Endogenous policy crises 
 
Policy crises can range from ‘acts of war, threats of force, and terrorist attacks to 
environmental calamities, industrial accidents, health epidemics, and natural disasters’ 
(Schneider and Jordan, 2016). Many of these are exogenous (such as disasters) or 
man-made (such as industrial accidents) and are usually not related to the strategic 
agency of political actors. An endogenous crisis, on the other hand, features such 
strategic motives and deliberate action. 
The phrase manufactured crisis is a recurring term in reports and studies, with 
subjects ranging from public schools (Berliner and Biddle, 1996) to social security 
(Baker and Weisbrot, 2001; here under the more derogatory ‘phony crisis’ moniker). 
Most recently, it was applied to the Iran ‘nuclear scare’ (Porter, 2014). Its wide-ranging 
usage points toward a concept that travels well through fields and paradigms. 
Generally speaking, this approach is associated with the ‘power-critical’ branch 
of crisis studies (Hart, 1993: 37). This states that – as opposed to practitioner-oriented 
research focusing on crisis management – policy crises are ‘politically controversial 
phenomena’ and are best understood as elements of a constructed social reality. 
While from this research direction have stemmed a fair amount of studies of the 
politics of crisis, these have mostly used the presence of policy crisis as a given, a fact 
of reality that political actors can relate to (e.g. by ‘exploiting’ it – Boin et al., 2009). 
However, a conceptualization of endogenously created crises remains elusive.  
A compact definition of the latter can be constructed by combining this notion 
with the theory of political entrepreneurship. Non-exogenous policy crises are those 
initiated from within the domestic political system, as opposed to, for example, the 
Iran hostage crisis of 1979–1981. A sub-type of these are man-made crises, intentional 
or unintentional: their subject, severity, and timing is not dictated by factors from 
outside the community of political actors. Finally, a manufactured crisis is both 
endogenous and is ushered in by the strategic intent of political entrepreneurs as 
opposed to unintended consequences.  
Our primary concern in this paper is the sub-type of endogenous crisis initiated 
by political entrepreneurs. The notion of manufactured crisis, then, posits a causal 
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link between independent political factors and dependent policy variables. Case 
studies that fall under this or other monikers abound in the literature. Hay (2010) 
demonstrates that the ‘Winter of Discontent,’ the period of major strikes in 1979 in 
the United Kingdom against the policies of the Labour government in charge at the 
time, was ‘in many respects a manufactured crisis,’ concluding that ‘Keynesianism’s 
death in Britain was not economically given, but politically orchestrated.’ This 
literature, in contrast to the similar research direction centered on the term ‘crisis 
exploitation,’ does not take crisis as a given. While crisis opens new avenues for 
strategic behavior (as described in e.g. Boin et al., 2009: 83), our focus is less on ‘post-
crisis politicking’ and ‘framing contests’ than pre-crisis brinkmanship.  
In this, its roots are in theories of endogenous crisis in general, and the role of 
political entrepreneurship that initiates these in particular. Studies of endogenous 
crisis are now abundant in economics, where financial meltdowns provide ample data 
on intra-system imbalances, upsetting more traditional theoretical accounts (see 
Lucarelli, 2011: 7–9). While these may be endogenous crises of the unintended sort, 
intentionality is more difficult to avoid – or: easier to establish – in political science 
studies. Here, the prevalence of exogenous explanations of change is more of an 
obstacle (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 5–7). Furthermore, endogeneity may be 
defined by factors other than the general political system, as in the case of political 
institutions, which can change according to varying patterns of self-enforcement and 
reinforcement. 
 
3. The role of political entrepreneurship in manufacturing crises 
 
In order to cut through some theoretical complexity, our focus is on political 
entrepreneurship as a distinct force for endogenous policy change. In this we follow 
the literature on various aspects of the entrepreneurship of political aspects, such as 
public, institutional, political and policy entrepreneurs (see e.g. Schneider et al., 1995; 
Sebők, 2018; Laffan, 1997; and Sheingate, 2003, respectively), which portray 
bureaucrats and politicians as ‘agents of change.’ Mintrom and Norman (2009) go on 
to directly link policy entrepreneurship and policy change.  
What is somewhat less well elaborated in this line of research is an account of 
political entrepreneurship performed by groups or networks, as opposed to 
individuals or homogeneous coalitions. This approach may be particularly fruitful in 
assessing the sub-types of manufactured crisis. The subjects of agency (i.e. individuals 
or groups) are of interest insofar as they reshape how the crisis unfolds: more 
heterogeneous players with unstable preferences may – but need not – add dynamic 
depth to the game.  
Needless to say, multiple sources contribute to the conversion of simple games 
to multi-stage dynamic games. The shifting membership and, therefore, underlying 
preference-structure of coalitions as political entrepreneurs is one such factor. Their 
capability to ‘manufacture opportunities themselves by transforming “events” into 
“crises”’ (Polsby, 1983: 168–170, cited by Sheingate, 2003: 189) may be both 
reinforced or diluted by their multi-agent setup.  
Our outlook is also affected by the nature of the leverage and the stakes 
involved. Baumgartner and Jones (2010: 21–22) make the distinction between policy 
subsystems and the macropolitical level. Crises of only subsystem-level interest can be 
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pushed up to the level of macropolitics, where attention is scarce and sequential: at 
any given time, general interest cable news channels will only cover a handful of 
events. One indicator of such macropolitical potential is the leverage involved. The 
Cuban Missile Crisis was of utmost importance not only because the exact location or 
destructive capability of the missiles involved; it was magnified by its relation to 
defense doctrines and the validity of verbal ultimatums in a multi-phase Cold War 
game.  
Similar near-existential threats include protracted strikes (as in the case of the 
Winter of Discontent) and other disruptions to the ordinary provision of basic goods 
and services. Legislative gridlock may also be a source of policy crises: obstruction (in 
the form or filibuster or other institutionalized veto points) can undermine 
government policies, thereby impacting the everyday life of citizens.  
In light of these considerations our research question is related to the role of 
political entrepreneurship in the creation of manufactured crises. We argue that given 
the right institutional environment, political entrepreneurs, even those outside the 
political mainstream, can use crisis manufacturing to their advantage. Since no off-the-
shelf theoretical treatments are available for studying the logic of manufactured crisis, 
we rely on an empirical case study of what appears to be a clear-cut case of an 
endogenous crisis: the so-called fiscal wars of the early 2010s.  
In this period, in order to exploit the institutional veto points related to fiscal 
policy in the U.S. constitutional system, various actors associated with the Republican 
Party and the Tea Party movement used a networked, coalition-based approach to 
advance their goals. Although their quest to instill a regime of fiscal conservatism was 
eventually unsuccessful, they did manage to raise their national profile and set the 
policy agenda for an extended period. 
For the insurgents, the institutional arrangement of the debt ceiling proved an 
accurate choice for a battlefield with its high risk nature and sound footings in popular 
opinion (see unpopular bailouts). Nevertheless, despite the generally favorable setting 
it took proficient political entrepreneurship to manufacture a crisis of the given 
proportions. Insurgencies – a moniker which was also often applied to the Tea Party, 
and with good reason – frequently resort to elements of asymmetrical warfare, such as 
hostage-taking, suicide bombers, and other suspensions of the laws of war (or in this 
case: conventions and gentleman’s agreements not to tinker with the full faith and 
credit of the U.S.). Guerrilla warfare is often characterized by small numbers of 
mutineers (or ‘freedom fighters’), their dependence on popular help, and 
decentralized, amorphous system of command.  
The networked, coalition-based and guerrilla approach to manufacturing policy 
crises – as well as its potential for subverting existing policy arrangements – represents 
a potentially unique class of endogenous crisis, which could be fleshed out using real 
world examples. In particular, we will investigate the factors explaining the networked 
nature of the Tea Party crisis manufacturing coalition; how political entrepreneurs 
designed and operated that network; and how the dynamic nature of shifting political 
coalitions offered the possibility for more radical participants to hijack the 
conservative agenda and to further escalate the situation.
2
  
                                                        
2
 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments on the research question and the logic of 
manufactured crisis. 
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Furthermore, we discuss whether these three key elements of the case are 
connected; i.e. whether networks are especially suited to crisis manufacturing via 
shifting coalitions. In order to realize the theoretical potential of this framework for 
studying endogenous policy crises, we adopt a case-study-based, inductive approach to 
theory development which is thoroughly informed by our empirical work. 
 
4. Case selection 
 
In this article we rely on outcome-centric research in exploring the logic of 
manufactured crisis (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 184). The examination of 
these propositions is undertaken by utilizing the conventions of qualitative case study 
research. Our aim is to provide an ‘analytic narrative’ that ‘pays close attention to 
stories, accounts and context’ while at the same time extracting ‘explicit and formal 
lines of reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation’ (Bates et al., 1998: 
10). Our focus is on internal validity, even as we are optimistic with regard to a 
potential generalization of the framework (see Discussion). 
The U.S. debt ceiling crisis is an obvious case for the study of manufactured 
crisis for a number of reasons, including the consensus of various participants and 
commentators that in fact it was the result of strategic intent aimed at policy stability.
3
 
As Jessop (2014: 18) put it, the U.S. ‘fiscal cliff’ negotiations exemplified ‘the paradox 
of a political stagecraft that manufactures crises or controversy around some issues 
and thereby diverts political attention from other, perhaps more fundamental, themes, 
problems and crises (which are depoliticalized by default).’  
The notion of a ‘fiscal cliff’ is closely related to the post-2000 implosion of the 
extant institutional structure and informal conventions regarding U.S. fiscal policy 
(Meyers, 2014). Partly due to the extreme polarization of American politics (Jacobson, 
2013), the previously innocuous policy instrument of the debt ceiling was turned into a 
weapon in political fights. The clear deadlines and high stakes (i.e. financial collapse) 
associated with its resolution lent themselves well to games-of-chicken-style set ups for 
intransigent political actors.  
In this, and besides its evidently endogenous nature, the debt ceiling case also 
offers a control group of previous instances when the renewal of federal borrowing 
authority was routine drill. Ever since the introduction of a wholesale debt limit – as 
opposed to individual authorizations – in 1917, and the subsequent extension of the 
rule to nearly all U.S. financial obligations, the debate had largely steered clear of the 
fiscal cliff: ‘despite the rhetoric, when push comes to shove debt ceiling increases get 
the votes they need – though often not without considerable political strife’ (Wallach, 
2013: 3). 
                                                        
3
 See e.g. a Wall Street Journal article assuming that House Speaker John Boehner’s ‘decision to 
postpone a debt ceiling showdown is best understood as the GOP's attempt to break a cycle of 
manufactured crises that have worked to President Obama's advantage.’ 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324624404578258221969657306 
Similarly, a New York Times editorial called the fiscal feuding ‘an artificial national crisis that put the 
economy and the savings of Americans at risk.’ http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/opinion/end-the-
debt-limit.html 
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It is no overstatement that an ‘exemption consensus’ prevailed in U.S. politics 
for almost a century before the fiscal wars of 2011–2013.4 This encompassed two 
strands of opinion: the very cessation of the debt ceiling provision and the de facto 
termination of the requirement to be achieved by circumvention (see the so-called 
Gephardt, and McConnell rules). While important differences remain between the 
two positions, for our purposes they signify the same content: the elimination of the 
debt ceiling provision as a means of crisis manufacturing. 
As far as methods are concerned, in this study strategic intent on behalf of those 
critical of consecutive debt ceiling increases is unearthed by an analysis of secondary 
sources, including media reports, voting behavior, pressure group scorecards, and 
FCC filings. The wealth of information surrounding the debt ceiling crisis provides a 
magnificent target for a study of such a low level of demand with regard to external 
validity.  
 
5. Case study: The U.S. debt ceiling and crisis manufacturing by 
coalition 
 
5.1 A network of political entrepreneurs 
 
The key element of the endogenous emergence of policy crises is crisis manufacturing 
undertaken by political entrepreneurs. In the case of the debt ceiling negotiations in 
the early 2010s, these entrepreneurs were mainly associated with the Republican Party 
and/or the conservative movement. Major players included House Speaker John 
Boehner and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, as well as Tea Party 
members of both Houses of Congress, and the grassroots and its unofficial leaders: 
former VP-nominee Sarah Palin and radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh.  
A further refinement involves detaching the group of fiscally conservative 
‘Young Guns’ of the time (such as House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, Whip Kevin 
McCarthy, and Rep. Paul Ryan) from establishment figures in other leadership and 
senior committee positions. Tea Party financiers (such as the Koch brothers) and their 
networks also merit consideration as autonomous players.  
The congressional arm of the Tea Party movement had its origins in the stance 
of ‘strident fiscal conservatives like Senator Harry F. Byrd’ (Wallach, 2013). A more 
immediate progenitor was the historic Republican takeover of the House, hallmarked 
by the Contract with America, the brainchild of former House Speaker Newt 
                                                        
4
 Besides most Democrats, at various times and in different forms this view was endorsed by an extremely 
heterogeneous group of Republican policy-makers and stakeholders. These included FED-chair Ben 
Bernanke, former OMB directors David Stockman, Mitch Daniels and Jim Nussle, and former 
presidential candidate Steve Forbes. Similarly, business leaders (such as Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd 
Blankfein and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), and an overwhelming majority of a Booth Business 
School survey of thirty-six leading economists questioned the usefulness of the provision and/or decried 
attempts to use it for political brinkmanship. Even the Wall Street Journal joined the ranks of the repeal 
camp, arguing that since ‘Republicans are never willing to shoot their debt-limit hostage (…) the limit has 
now become Democratic leverage against Republicans. Why continue the pretense of fighting over a debt 
limit that doesn't limit debt?’ 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304104504579377303355489512?mod=WSJ_O
pinion_LEADTop 
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Gingrich. His standoff with President Bill Clinton resulted in two consecutive 
government shutdowns – for reasons very similar to the limited government-themed 
demands of the Tea Party insurgency. 
The protagonists of this second coming of a Republican revolution were more 
diverse and less centralized. A month before the 2010 midterms a nationwide canvass 
of Tea Party organizers by the Washington Post asked ‘Which national figure best 
represents your groups?’ and got the following responses: no one, 34 per cent, Sarah 
Palin, 14 per cent, Glenn Beck, 7 per cent, Jim DeMint, 6 per cent, Ron Paul, 6 per 
cent, Michele Bachmann, 4 per cent.
5
 Before the intake of Tea-Party-affiliated new 
members of Congress – and her own thematic presidential run in 2012 – Bachmann 
formed the Tea Party Caucus, which – at least as an official center of Tea Party 
politics – did not take hold.6 Tea Party activists revered the individual citizen and 
distrusted the Beltway elite. 
The focal point of the Tea Party had always been outside Congress, dispersed 
across America and less structured than would have normally been the case with a 
movement of such political clout. In consequence, members of Congress associated 
with the Tea Party often resorted to a constrained view of their mandate, summarized 
in the approach of a ‘Contract from America’ and the practice of signing pledges (such 
as the Anti-Tax Pledge). In the face of this power vacuum, talk show hosts, TV 
commentators and out-of-work Republican politicians vied for leadership status and 
popular support. Nevertheless, the movement was not entirely grassroots or self-
financed. Non-profit organizations set up by conservative businessmen or activists 
(such as Tea Party Patriots, FreedomWorks, and Americans for Prosperity) provided 
support to like-minded causes (sometimes by astroturfing) and candidates from the 
beginning. 
The basic cleavages were thus encoded in the structure of the debt ceiling 
debate from the beginning of 2011. Three somewhat coherent blocs of political actors 
took to the trenches: Democrats, by and large united around a strategy of cost 
minimization in exchange for raising the debt ceiling; establishment Republicans, 
sharing in and often leading party efforts to exert maximum concessions from 
Democrats in non-military spending cuts without sacrificing the full faith and credit in 
U.S. debt; and Tea Party faithful, who were only interested in abrupt changes of 
dramatic proportions in the face of a perceived ‘big government takeover’ of America. 
With this cast of characters, crisis manufacturing on behalf of a network of 
conservative actors unfolded in three overlapping phases between 2009 and 2013.  
 
5.1.1 Phase 1: Debt is in the air (2009–2011) 
 
The movement that eventually gained attention as the Tea Party engaged in its first 
bursts of political activity in early 2009 in response to the first stimulus package by 
incoming president Barack Obama and a Congress controlled by Democrats.
7
 With 
upcoming legislation that included the Affordable Care Act (‘Obamacare’), an aborted 
                                                        
5
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/tea-party-canvass/ 
6
 Form some, any formal caucus constituted a betrayal of the grassroots origins of the movement (Chaffetz 
– http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/40528.html). For others, even the Tea Party Caucus was not 
radical enough: they went on to form the Liberty Caucus (https://www.facebook.com/houselibertycaucus). 
7
 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/us/politics/28keli.html 
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attempt at introducing cap-and-trade-style climate change regulation, and the Dodd-
Frank financial regulation package, right-wing activists were mobilized by a ‘leftward 
lurch’ in federal policy. The icing on the cake was a 1.9 trillion USD increase in the 
debt ceiling, which even some Democrats – mostly ‘blue dogs’ from vulnerable 
districts – voted down. They also insisted on tougher rules for future spending (pay-as-
you-go rules).  
In light of these developments, elements of the credo and legislative agenda of 
the upstart Tea Party movement were shortlisted via online voting (with more than 
450,000 participants, according to organizers).
8
 The resulting 10-point Contract from 
America included a balanced budget constitutional amendment, a tax code of 4,543 
words (the length of the original constitution), a limit on annual growth in federal 
spending, a moratorium on earmarking and a ban on tax increases. This selection 
attests to the preoccupation of the Tea Party with all things fiscal (and with a direct 
constitutional foundation for any public policy proposals).  
 Furthermore, opinion polls seemed to suggest that the public was on board 
for a more restrictive budgetary approach. An AP-CNBC poll showed a 14 per cent 
increase over two years in the response ‘very worried’ to the question ‘How worried 
are you that increasing federal debt will harm the financial future of your children?’ 
The result (56 per cent, with 29 per cent ‘somewhat worried’) substantiated Tea Party 
claims that the majority of the electorate had become hostile towards new 
interventionist programs by the federal government.
9
 Nevertheless, as to the structure 
of budgetary rebalancing, participants were evenly split between spending even more 
on priorities such as education, on the one hand, and cutting spending on the other.  
 Explanations for the causes of ‘runaway’ public debt were just as conflicting. 
Democratic conventional wisdom blamed the Bush tax cuts, the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and the combination of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
recession. Tea Party rhetoric was centered around crises of a different sort: 
manufactured crises. At the time, Glenn Beck made frequent references to the echoes 
of a ‘possible arrival of a ‘New World Order,’ which would be ushered in by Mr. 
Obama using ‘a strategy of manufactured crisis to destroy the economy and pave the 
way for dictatorship.’ Tea Party activists repeated these arguments around the country. 
It was not long before Republican strategists – by principle, and also convinced that 
they were on the right side of public opinion – set out to manufacture a crisis of their 
own. 
 
5.1.2 Phase 2: Strategic unity – tactical diversity (2010–2011) 
 
It has to be emphasized that the panic surrounding ever-increasing public debt was 
not, by any stretch, the invention of right-wing conspiracy theorists. Federal debt was 
increasing at a historic rate in nominal terms (see Figure 1), with a surge in Debt/GDP 
from the mid-fifties during the period 1990–2006 to 91 per cent in 2011.10 Projections 
looked even worse with entitlement-related spending getting especially out of hand 
                                                        
8
 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/politics/15contract.html?_r=0 
9
 http://surveys.ap.org/data per cent5CGfK per cent5CAP-CNBC per cent20Poll per cent20Topline per 
cent201 per cent20112310.pdf 
10
 Indexes differ according to the specifics of underlying data. The calculations presented here are 
corroborated by St. Louis FED data: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GFDEGDQ188S. 
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(CBO, 2011: 80). In the short term, the unusually long recession took its toll, as did 
the – short-lived – discretionary spending increases denounced by Tea Party activists 
(again, see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Statutory debt, spending, and GDP growth: 1948–2013 
 
Source: OMB, Bureau of Economic Analysis. End of fiscal year.  
 
The fiscal situation was worsening but immediate repercussions were not expected: 
bond yields remained low for a sustained period and a fiscal collapse was not on the 
horizon. In this situation it required political entrepreneurship to convert a moral 
panic into a political, let alone a legislative, strategy. Not that Republican leaders had 
much choice
11
: Tea Partiers held liable both parties for runaway debt and also posed a 
larger threat to the establishment of the GOP: most ‘patriots’ were Republicans and, 
by virtue of their mobilization networks, a threat to reckon with in Republican 
primaries. Post-crisis accounts of events were unerring in declaring that ‘the 
establishment held back the Tea Party by basically co-opting their issues and rhetoric  
–  while in the process moving the party even more to the right.’12 Yet there was a fine 
line between co-option and forcing a shutdown, as Boehner made clear to incoming 
freshmen in December 2010: ‘For people who’ve never been in politics it’s going to 
be one of those growing moments (...) but we’ll have to find a way to (...) help people 
understand the serious problem that would exist if we didn’t do it.’13 
Based on the premises of ‘adult’ behavior on the part of the eighty-five 
incoming House members, a coalition between establishment- and Tea Party 
Republicans firmly set in: Boehner had donated ‘millions of dollars from his own 
campaign chest to the challengers,’14 singled out the ‘monstrous’ ACA as a target for 
repeal and, after the election, announced a renewal of the Republican moratorium on 
budgetary earmarks. The speaker-in-waiting was also no stranger to some leading Tea 
Party organizers, notably Dick Armey, with whom he had served as a member of the 
Gingrich House leadership (and Armey duly endorsed him for Speaker
15
). He was 
fully preparing to ‘lead by being led.’  
                                                        
11
 Even as they acted as agents of the agenda. Their analytical status is, therefore, ambiguous.  
12
 http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/08/09/tea-party-steers-gop-right-away-from-white-
house/TrzlNOrjXO4Oin3MI1RVEN/story.html 
13
 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/13/house-rule-4?currentPage=all 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/10/20/dick-armey-backs-john-boehner-for-house-speaker/ 
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Even then, there were ominous signs: candidates with Tea Party backing – such 
as Peter Schiff in Connecticut – were touting their pledges to devote all their ‘time in 
the US Senate to forcing an immediate end to deficit spending, by leading a filibuster 
against the raising of the national debt ceiling and fighting every big spending bill that 
comes across the Senate floor’ (in the event, Schiff lost his primary).16 Similar pledges 
were made by hundreds of Tea Party candidates in a Ulysses-like act of tying 
themselves to the mast against the siren calls of big government. Before long (in 
December) there was ‘disagreement between Boehner and (…) at least one freshman 
member of the leadership team, about how to control the federal deficit.’17  
Thinly veiled threats were also issued by the Young Guns. When Boehner had 
suggested in an interview that ‘he might compromise with Democrats if the middle-
class tax cut was the only option,’ McCarthy was quick to push back: ‘It’s a 
generational thing (…) we have our ideals, but also our principles.’ Ryan added: 
Boehner never asked him to tone down his anti-debt rhetoric: ‘I think he realizes the 
kind of class we’ve got coming in, and the kind of times that we are in (…) And I think 
he realizes that he can’t stand athwart history or the direction of this new conference, 
anyway. If he tried, they’d throw him out.’18 With a potential challenge for the 
speakership by Cantor looming, Boehner had a vested interest in championing the 
cause of spending and – by inference – debt reduction.  
Next on the agenda was how to approach the issue in an adult, but at the same 
time expedient and unhesitating manner. ‘Starving the beast’ of federal government 
had been a favorite policy proposal of conservatives for decades – even when a 
balanced budget (or, indeed, debt reduction in general or a ban on earmarked funds 
to be used in the states or locally) was not high on the agenda.
19
 While fiscal 
conservatism was gaining strength with the electorate, House Republicans were also 
conscious of what the T.E.A. in the Tea Party stood for: Taxed Enough Already.  
Thus the issue of spending reduction was chosen as the carrier for a strategy of 
confrontation with a Democratic president and Senate. As Rep. Ryan put it: ‘we owe it 
to our employers, the people who elected us, to give them a choice of two futures.’20 
The other signature item on the Tea Party agenda was even more self-evident: over 
2009 the conservative base developed an obsession with the Democrats’ health care 
proposal, fretting over a purported government takeover of their insurance policies in 
general, and ‘death panels’ in particular.21 ‘Obamacare’ perfectly fit the bill, being a 
second issue directly related to the overarching leviathan theme so popular with Tea 
Partiers.  
In the event, the combination of spending cuts and an anti-health-care stance 
had naturally developed into a winning combination for Republicans preparing to gain 
                                                        
16
 http://www.redstate.com/diary/goper/2010/05/26/with-rob-simmons-out-support-the-tea-party-candidate/ 
17
 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/13/house-rule-4?currentPage=2 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 The Reagan presidency was notorious for its rocketing public debt (see Wallach, 2013). And anti-
earmark crusaders in Congress (such as Tom Coburn – who even earned the nickname Dr. No) were 
often vilified by fellow Republicans more captivated by the idea of getting reelected.  
20
 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/13/house-rule-4?currentPage=2 
21
 A term coined by Sarah Palin to describe – incorrectly – a segment (the Independent Payment Advisory 
Board) of the proposed legislation as authorizing bureaucrats to decide who were ‘worthy of medical 
care.’ Between 2010 and 2012 about four in ten U.S. adults consistently shared this opinion. 
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/258753-poll-four-in-10-believe-in-health-law-death-panels 
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a majority in the House in the 2010 midterms (the Senate, at that time, seemed out of 
reach). The former was selected as an agenda item and manufactured by the coalition 
of a diverse selection of players, creating common ground for at least some part of the 
period. All participants did their part: talk show hosts and town-hall speakers 
amplifying the negative message, Young Guns rolling out alternative policy proposals, 
and party leadership recruiting and aiding candidates to take on vulnerable 
Democrats.  
Yet one piece was missing: a bridge between electoral and legislative strategy or, 
put more simply, a path to ‘get things done.’ This was not trivial, as Democrats were 
expected to hold on to the Senate and the president professed to be trigger happy 
about vetoing any acts that would have undone his first-term achievements. In a 
system based on the separation of powers, a freshly mobilized House majority needed 
allies, or at least some sort of institutional leverage. If they could not expect anything 
to get passed in concert with the Senate, they needed to create previously non-existent 
veto points to extract concessions.  
The debt ceiling was an obvious target. Ryan himself lambasted it
22
 during the 
previous increase, which was passed with zero Republican votes and 37 Democrats 
joining them in opposition
23
 (see Table 1). Some Democrats even suggested that it was 
the job of the Republican House majority to make sure that the country avoided 
default (Draper, 2012: 56). Ultimately, Republicans were convinced they would come 
out victorious from this high-stakes game, even if – realistically – it boiled down to a 
choice between government shutdown and/or default or lifting the debt ceiling (at 
best, with strings attached). The Young Guns were perfectly cognizant of this fact and 
proactively discouraged talk of a ‘nay’ vote, in contrast to their otherwise belligerent 
rhetoric (see e.g. ibid: 225). 
 
                                                        
22
 http://www.c-span.org/video/?291937-1/house-session 
23
 http://houselive.gov/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=4317 
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Table 1 Selected fiscal roll calls in House of Representatives (2010-2014) 
 
Date Subject Act name No. Dem Y Dem N Rep Y Rep N Y Total Note 
111th Congress – Speaker: Pelosi (D) 
Feb.4, 
2010
24
 
Debt ceiling, 
PAYGO 
Statutory pay-as-
you-go 
HJ 45. PL. 
111-139 
217 37 0 175 217 N: Blue Dogs 
(Giffords) 
Dec. 
16, 
2010
25
 
Tax cuts 
expiring 
Tax relief, 
unemployment.
.. 
HR 4853. PL. 
111-312 
139 112 138 36 277 Y: Cantor, 
McCarthy, 
Ryan, Ron 
Paul 
N: Bachmann, 
Gohmert 
112th Congress – Speaker: Boehner (R) 
March 
2, 
2011
26
 
Continuing 
resolution 
(4) 
Further 
Continuing 
Appropriations 
Amendments 
 
HJ 44. 
PL. 112-4 
104 85 231 6 335 Y: Cantor, 
Ryan 
McCarthy 
N: Bachmann, 
Gohmert, 
Paul; Pelosi 
March 
16, 
2011
27
 
Continuing 
resolution 
(5) 
Additional 
Continuing 
Appropriations 
Amendments 
 
HJ 48. 
PL. 112-6 
85 104 186 54 271 N: Bachmann, 
Gohmert, 
Chaffetz, 
Labrador, 
King (IA), 
Jordan, 
Mulvaney, 
Paul 
N: Pelosi 
April 9, 
2011
28
 
Continuing 
resolution 
(6) 
Further 
Additional 
Continuing 
Appropriations 
Amendments 
 
PL. 112-8 140 42 208 28 348 N: Bachmann, 
Gohmert, 
Chaffetz, 
Labrador, 
King (IA), 
Jordan, 
Mulvaney 
Apr. 14, 
2011
29
 
Continuing 
resolution 
(7) 
Full-Year 
Continuing 
Appropriations 
 
HR 1473.  81 108 179 59 260 Y: Cantor, 
Ryan 
N: Bachmann 
and other Tea 
Party 
members, 
Pelosi  
Aug. 1, 
2011
30
 
Debt ceiling, 
sequestratio
n rule 
Budget control S 365. PL 
112-25 
95 95 174 66 269 Y: Cantor, 
Pelosi 
N: Bachmann 
and other Tea 
Party 
members; 
McGovern 
and other 
                                                        
24 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll046.xml 
25 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll647.xml 
26 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll154.xml 
27 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll179.xml 
28 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll253.xml 
29 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll268.xml 
30 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll690.xml 
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Date Subject Act name No. Dem Y Dem N Rep Y Rep N Y Total Note 
progressives 
Jan. 1, 
2013
31
 
Fiscal cliff American 
taxpayer relief 
HR 8. PL. 
112-240 
172 16 85 151 257 S: Only 8 
Nays, incl. 
Rand, Rubio, 
Lee  
113th Congress – Speaker: Boehner (R) 
Jan. 23, 
2013
32
 
Temporary 
debt ceiling 
No budget, no 
pay  
HR 325. PL 
113-3 
86 111 199 33 285 Y: Cantor, 
Ryan, Scalise, 
Jordan 
N: Bachmann 
and other Tea 
Party 
members, 
Pelosi 
Octobe
r 16, 
2013
33
 
Debt ceiling, 
Continuing 
resolution 
Continuing 
appropriations 
HR 2775. 
PL. 113-46 
198 0 87 144 285 Y: Cantor, 
Pelosi 
N: Bachmann 
and other Tea 
Party 
members  
Feb.11, 
2014
34
 
Clean debt 
ceiling 
Temporary debt 
limit extension 
S 540.  193 2 28 199 221 Y: Cantor, 
McCarthy 
N: Ryan 
   AVERAGE 137 65 138 86 275  
Source: Author and http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31967.pdf Note: Y=Yea/Aye, 
N=Nay/Noe, S=Senate 
 
However, some members of the Republican conference did not share this approach 
of a game of strategy. Political capital was to be accumulated not only by crisis-
solution, but by creative destruction. For these Republicans, compromise on fiscal 
issues meant antagonizing their dearly held principles and guaranteed primary defeat 
in 2012.  
Despite these ominous signs, and in stark contrast to the social conservative-
neocon coalition behind the George W. Bush presidency, incoming majority leader 
Cantor highlighted four issues for his conference: jobs and the economy; cutting 
spending; shrinking the federal government; and expanding individual liberty (Draper, 
2002: 47). During a closed-door retreat in mid-January, Cantor also pleaded with his 
troops to ‘look at a potential increase in the debt limit as a leverage moment when the 
White House and President Obama will have to deal with us. (...) Either we stick 
together and demonstrate that we’re a team that will fight for and stand by our 
principles, or we will lose that leverage.’35 
The first application of the general strategy came in March–April, 2011 by 
which time previous appropriations for the fiscal year October 2010–September 2011 
had run out. As no budget had been passed by September 2010, continuing 
                                                        
31 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll659.xml 
32 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll030.xml 
33 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll550.xml 
34 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll061.xml 
35
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/origins-of-the-debt-
showdown/2011/08/03/gIQA9uqIzI_story.html 
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resolutions covered expenditure on the general level of the previous fiscal year. And 
since no grand bargain had been conjured up during the lame-duck session of 
December (or based on the Bowles–Simpson recommendations) the federal 
government was now on a ticking clock until March 4. House Republicans kicked the 
can down the road twice more in exchange for roughly $10 billion in spending cuts. At 
this point a government shutdown was scheduled for April 8. A seventh continuing 
resolution was agreed on just hours before furloughs were scheduled to take place at 
the cost of an additional cut of $38 billion from the budget proposal. However, as 
these, to a large extent, only targeted project or ‘conditionally mandatory’ 
expenditures, a CBO estimation put actual savings at a mere $355 million. For all 
their negotiations, compromises, and painful votes, Tea Party Republicans felt tricked. 
Incremental changes were made to the strategy before the next potential 
showdown, the August 2 debt ceiling deadline. This included a more concentrated 
voting procedure, as the previous approach created ‘divisions rather than promot[ing] 
unity within the conference.’ Among the ideas floated as preconditions for a potential 
compromise, the usual subjects came up: repealing Obamacare, a balanced budget 
constitutional amendment, and caps on mandatory spending. Only a ‘dozen or so’ 
members ruled out a deal (Draper, 2012: 226).  
In a quest to instill unity in a rowdy caucus a bill was put forth by the majority 
leadership that embraced a series of popular proposals by the membership in order to 
‘cut, cap and balance’ (CCB) the budget. In exchange for raising the debt limit it 
stipulated steep cuts in non-military spending, and made future debt ceiling hikes 
conditional on passing a balanced budget amendment to the constitution. However, as 
it did not contain provisions to defund Obamacare, and (based on their general anti-
increase stance) Reps. Bachmann, Paul, and Jones did not support it (along with 181 
Democrats).
36
  
With this display of purity most House Republicans were basically done 
negotiating with the White House – it took a concerted effort on behalf of the 
leadership of both chambers and the president to reach a last-minute agreement based 
on a modified version of CCB, a far cry from any sort of grand bargain. Boehner was 
right to emphasize the similarities between the two proposals, including avoiding tax 
increases and guarantees of future spending cuts in the form of sequestration.
37
 
That said, the vote had ambiguous results as to who won or lost. From the 
perspective of our research question, the most important development was that it 
provoked a lasting rift in camaraderie within the Tea Party caucus, and also within the 
Republican conferences in Congress. Throughout the entire crisis period between 
2011 and 2014 the Republican House majority mustered by itself the necessary 218 
votes for key fiscal roll calls on a single occasion (on March 2, 2011, see Table 1). It 
was no different with this first debt ceiling showdown, as – on August 1st, just one day 
before the shutdown deadline – sixty-six Republicans ‘defected’ (and the others were 
accused of defection by Tea Party media
38
).
39
 
5.1.3 Phase 3: Taking sides (2011–2013) 
                                                        
36
 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll606.xml#N 
37
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/01/us/politics/20110801_BOEHNER_DEBT_FRAMEW
ORK.html?_r=0 
38
 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/29/allen-west-tea-party-schizophrenia-debt_n_913283.html 
39
 This is telling even as most votes allowed for tactical voting. 
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The most important takeaway for hardcore Tea Party believers from the events of 
March-August 2011 was that gratification had been delayed once again. Obamacare 
was the law of the land; there was no realistic chance of passing a balanced budget 
amendment; and several compatriots gave in under pressure from party leadership. 
Along with the impending presidential primaries, the 2012 elections provided a new 
opportunity for Tea Party strategists to advance their agenda. 
Throughout the tense process of the 2011–2013 fiscal crisis, members of 
Congress repeatedly refused to rule out testing the waters when it came to default. 
Tim Scott denounced the thought that a deal was ‘a foregone conclusion (…) I’d like 
to let the proof be in the pudding.’40 When presented with projections regarding the 
fallout from default, ‘conservatives like Georgia Rep. Phil Gingrey read (…) emails 
from banker friends who didn’t buy it.’41 John Fleming went on the record, stating that 
‘nothing happens’ if the debt ceiling is reached.42 With default, or a protracted 
shutdown, remaining uncharted territory, some House Republicans were still 
preparing for a final fiscal showdown. 
Yet circumstances somewhat changed for the second half of the period. As 
opposed to the 2010 midterms, Democrats now picked up eight seats in the House 
(but remained the minority party), and two in the Senate. President Obama also won a 
second term against the mainstream Republican Mitt Romney who had previously 
defeated a number of Tea-Party-backed contenders (including House firebrand 
Bachmann).  
The crisis of 2011 also left the Republicans more divided about and averse to 
fiscal brinkmanship. By fall the Republican ‘cardinals’ on the appropriations 
committees were in full revolt over hardliners undercutting their proposed bills 
(Draper, 2012: 278). Cantor was progressively becoming a main target for the media 
at large over Republican intransigence. While he was still described by some as ‘the 
Republican leadership’s tether to the Tea Party,’ in fact he donated money to 
moderates and never joined the Tea Party Caucus (nor did the other Young Guns). 
Even ideologues who were otherwise on friendly terms with House Tea Partiers, such 
as Karl Rove, denounced their slash-and-burn tactics when it came to bargaining with 
Democrats: he declared that passing a viable measure ‘will require the GOP to accept 
less than total repeal of the Obama agenda, vote for spending cuts smaller than what 
they want, and support a debt increase all Republicans wish were not necessary.’43  
The exemption consensus was now ever powerful, and duly led to compromise 
(brokered once again in the Senate, with the help of vice-president Biden) on the 
upcoming editions of the crisis: the ‘fiscal cliff’ of December 2012, and also a 
temporary debt ceiling increase. The silver lining in all this was the arrival of a new ally 
for ‘liberty’-focused House members with the 2012 elections: Ted Cruz, the new 
junior senator from Texas. Along with Mike Lee and Rand Paul from the 2010 
intake, he developed a new veto point in a Senate that still retained individual 
                                                        
40
http://dailycaller.com/2010/12/21/house-freshman-leader-voices-doubts-about-boehners-first-adult-
moment-raising-debt-ceiling/ 
41
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/02/debt_limit_brinkmanship_is_dead_the
_republican_strategy_of_crisis_budgeting.html 
42
 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/house-republicans-government-shutdown-96968_Page2.html 
43
 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324581504578231672194516556 
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members’ right to obstruct – or ‘filibuster’ – proceedings. New methods also took root 
to persuade members of Congress to engage in responsible fiscal behavior: the next 
temporary debt ceiling hike was linked to passing a budget within three months. 
Without this, members of the chamber in question would have their pay withheld: no 
budget, no pay.  
However, the resulting new debt ceiling deadline of mid-May initiated once 
again a contentious process with the Young Guns now firmly in the leadership camp. 
Reps. Bridenstine and Huelskamp (along with twenty-eight others) proposed to eject 
Obamacare from a bill under consideration. This, in turn, ‘shocked’ Boehner and 
Cantor who prevented a full-blown revolt by rescheduling related votes.
44
 Tea Party 
activists such as Erick Erickson of RedState, a blog, were unimpressed, announcing 
that ‘House Conservatives Will Prove They Are the Problem.’45 
Open season was once again declared on the debt ceiling, but with Democrats 
less inclined to compromise, a sensible exit point was wanting. As Rep. Stutzman, who 
supported the ensuing government shutdown in October 2013, put it: ‘we have to get 
something out of this. And I don’t know what that even is.’46 Inside this ‘Republican 
suicide machine’ tensions were brewing.47 As the Treasury announced in late 
September that extraordinary measures would be exhausted no later than October 17, 
Cruz prepared to filibuster any legislation that funded Obamacare. In the meantime, 
the Wall Street Journal, no foe of spending cuts, concluded that ‘Kamikaze missions 
rarely turn out well, least of all for the pilots.’48 
Unrepentant, the no-compromise wing of the Republican Party crafted a letter 
to House leadership with eighty signatures demanding that the budget bill 
‘affirmatively de-fund’ Obamacare. Simultaneously, a Tea Party rally (‘Exempt 
America’49) was held on Capitol hill, featuring revolting lawmakers from both 
chambers. The ‘Williamsburg Accord’ of early 2013, devised to offer a ‘unified 
Republican strategy’ that drove ‘toward a new debt ceiling standoff with the president,’ 
was now officially void.
50
 
When Tea Partiers refused to vote for any debt ceiling increase and continuing 
resolution that did not defund Obamacare, the government went into a partial 
shutdown on October 1. The ball was once again in the court of the Senate in terms 
of coming up with a solution. Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell admitted that 
‘we were talking in the Senate Republican conference as early as July that (the 
hardcore strategy) had no chance of success.’51 Calling the twenty-one-hour filibuster 
speech on September 24 by Cruz a ‘quixotic venture,’ he was already busy brokering a 
deal with Senate majority leader Harry Reid that included the McConnell rule and 
                                                        
44
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/10/how-gop-hardliners-hijacked-boehner-debt ceiling-
obamacare 
45
 http://www.redstate.com/2013/03/06/today-house-conservatives-will-corrupt-america/ 
46
http://washingtonexaminer.com/gop-stands-firm-against-funding-bill-will-link-to-debt-ceiling-
fight/article/2536750 
47
 In retrospect, Paul Ryan also called it a “suicide mission”. 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-the-republican-suicide-machine-20131009  
http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/paul-ryan-rules-out-another-government-shutdown/?dcz= 
48
 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323846504579073083671216784 
49
 http://exemptamerica.com/ 
50
 http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-the-republican-suicide-machine-20131009?page=2 
51
 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/20/us/politics/senate-minority-leader-faces-dual-battles-in-gop.html 
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various other stopgap measures in order to avoid a recurrence of a fiscal showdown. 
Three days later, closure was finally voted on with only eighteen other Republican 
Senators joining, falling short of a blocking minority of forty.  
With the Tea Party losing the Senate front of the battle, House Republicans 
were once again confronted with the choice of default vs. a debt limit hike. Finally, on 
October 16, a conference amendment was passed with no Democrats opposed, but 
only a minority of House Republicans joining Boehner and Cantor in voting ‘yea.’52 As 
John McCain, the 2008 Republican presidential candidate, observed: ‘It did change 
the environment when the American people rejected the shutdown.’ He referred to 
polls conducted during the two weeks of the shutdown showing that 53 percent 
blamed Republicans for the crisis, compared with 31 percent who blamed Mr. 
Obama. These also represented the lowest party approval scores for the GOP in 
twenty-plus years.
53
 
In two months’ time, a budget agreement involving Rep. Ryan ended ‘the four 
year quest for a “grand bargain” by funding the government above the levels set in 
2011 and not cutting entitlements.’54 And with a ‘clean’ debt limit raise passed with 
mostly Democratic votes in February 2014, a three-year era of fiscal wars was finally 
over. 
 
6. Discussion      
 
In this article, we have argued that the networked, coalition-based and guerrilla 
approach to manufacturing policy crises represents a unique class of endogenous 
crisis. In particular, we investigated four aspects of the case at hand: (1) the factors 
explaining the networked nature of the Tea Party crisis-manufacturing coalition; (2) 
how political entrepreneurs designed and operated that network; (3) how the dynamic 
nature of shifting political coalitions offered the possibility for more radical 
participants to hijack the conservative agenda and to further escalate the situation; and 
(4) how these three key elements of the case are connected, i.e. whether networks are 
an especially suitable form of crisis manufacturing via shifting coalition. 
From a theoretical standpoint, by tackling these questions we may arrive at a 
more complete categorization of various types of crisis manufacturing. Here, beyond 
external factors, such as policy domain and geographic scope (see Conclusion), the 
key aspect may be related to internal structures of players, the multiplicity of games, 
and the dynamics of the game over time with repeated games.  
As for the first two topics, the fiscal wars of 2011–2013 were not the product of 
the centralized planning of a coherent player. But they were the product of strategic 
planning nevertheless: evidence discussed in the previous section points unequivocally 
towards the premeditated nature of the moves leading to the debt crisis. Republicans 
had repeatedly voted for clean debt limit increases before, or had invoked the 
Gephardt rule to the same effect. The way recurring debt ceiling negotiations led to 
                                                        
52
 No surprise, then, that in June 2014 Cantor was ‘primaried’, and suffered a shocking defeat from a 
relatively unknown college professor backed by the Tea Party. 
53
 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303382004579127571975912810 
54
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/02/debt_limit_brinkmanship_is_dead_the
_republican_strategy_of_crisis_budgeting.html 
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the brink of a ‘fiscal cliff’ in the early 2000s points towards an endogenous, 
manufactured crisis.  
The dynamic of the fiscal wars is key to understanding the consequences of 
coalition-building. Diverse preferences generate different payouts and exit points for 
participants. A complete alignment of preferences is not a precondition for success. 
Rather, this depends on the circumstances. In August 2011, House Republicans 
reached a deal that contained no tax increases, yet at the same time involved 
significant spending cuts. It also passed without the votes of Tea Party Republicans. 
This verged on achieving a maximum ransom without actually shooting the hostage.
55
 
However, divergent preferences caused tectonic movements in political tactics (i.e. 
breaking ranks with Cruz in the Senate), without which the strategy might have paid 
off.
56
  
After all, the strategy was based on common ground in terms of threats of a 
default. In this, a coalition-based strategy is analogous to a multi-stage rocket, with 
each stage consuming a separate propellant: in the case of the establishment the latter 
was deterrence; for Tea Partiers it was the capability of a first strike. It is also 
important to note that the dynamic nature of a coalition-based strategy may eventually 
play into the hands of more radical participants. The latter had a chance to jettison the 
majority leadership altogether by carrying over their momentum to a new stage with 
new veto points: Senate filibuster in this case. Escalation strategies may be developed 
throughout the dynamic game despite constraining initial circumstances. 
In light of this discussion, the Tea Party revolt was at its best when forcing 
temporary unity on the Republican leadership, compelling it to play hardball in the 
negotiations. At various points until August 2011 they exerted concessions from a 
president with his sights on a grand bargain that had previously been inconceivable. 
Congressional Democrats were less impressed, leading in most cases to idiosyncratic 
agreements involving (for the most part) congressional leadership and ex-Senate 
stalwart Biden. Throughout the fiscal wars, parallel channels of negotiations were 
open, with no clear indication of future prospects. Strategy was exerted without the 
help of a formal organization or central leadership. In the event, it was not so much a 
fully-fledged strategy as a blueprint thereof. This observation sums up our findings 
related to our first two questions. 
As for the third, network-based crisis-manufacturing had both its upsides and 
downsides. An unclear and shifting ‘membership’ – without a predefined mission 
statement – produced slipping towards the most extreme participants, and thus 
shifting goals. Veto points popped up inside the coalition at various times, 
undermining the bargaining of the day (along with previously agreed gains). These 
drawbacks were, however, largely offset by the advantages of network governance: 
time and time again outside pressure provided impetus for breaking gridlocks, such as 
threats of ‘primarying’ disloyal members. Moreover, obedience came on the cheap 
with a handful of blogs and dozens of local activists in each House district playing the 
role of disciplinarians.  
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 A widely-cited Wall Street Journal editorial quipped: ‘We’ll support efforts to cut spending and reform 
entitlements, but the political result will be far worse if Republicans start this fight only to cave in the end. 
You can’t take a hostage you aren’t prepared to shoot.’ 
 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323874204578217912983267062 
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 http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/paul-ryan-betrayer-110186.html?hp=l7 
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Finally, network-based crisis manufacturing proved particularly adept at 
expanding the conflict from the fiscal policy subsystem to macropolitics and the 
general political agenda (as described by Baumgartner and Jones, 2010: 21–22). 
Manufacturing it was: there were no low-hanging fruits in the fiscal wars with 
entrenched interests (e.g. providers and recipients), the existence of the prevailing 
‘exemption consensus’ and – at the end of the line – a progressive president and 
Senate majority. Just as in 1995, with the previous edition of shutdown politics, it took 
political entrepreneurship to reap the potential rewards of network-based 
brinkmanship. This entrepreneurship – on behalf of activists (such as Grover 
Norquist and Heritage Action, led by ex-Senator Jim DeMint), financiers (see the 
Koch Brothers) and politicians (Bachmann, Cruz, etc.) – provided the ideological 
coherence, chain of command, money source, and talking heads) for an improbably 
successful revolt.  
This is related to our fourth point and the overarching question of how we 
define success (or payout) for political entrepreneurs. Although the quest of the Tea 
Party to instill a regime of fiscal conservatism was eventually unsuccessful, they did 
manage to raise their national profile and set the policy agenda for an extended 
period. Despite being labeled ‘suicide missions’ in hindsight by bona fide 
conservatives, such as Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell, the insurgency gained 
maximum leverage with the hand it was given. At the end of the day, it took no more 
than a nucleus of twenty House republicans to stand up to the powerful exemption 
consensus and capture a large part of the political agenda for years in a row.  
Figure 2 demonstrates that a core group of less than two dozen House 
members were joined by fellow Conservative Study Group, Tea Party Caucus, and 
Liberty Caucus members (and from the other end of the ideological spectrum: 
progressive Democrats) in key bipartisan votes. However, legally speaking, they never 
constituted a blocking minority in either chamber.  
 
Figure 2 (Tea) Party of No: Number of ‘nay’ votes by members on selected roll calls 
 
Source: http://clerk.house.gov/, author’s own calculations 
It took a concerted effort by radical fiscal conservatives in both chambers and outside 
Congress to leverage a relatively weak hand to obtain palpable concessions and create 
an ongoing struggle that lasted more than three years. Entrepreneurship was present 
not just in engineering voting blocks for specific roll calls, but also in amassing 
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bargaining chips in a highly institutionalized environment. From a complex web of 
structural constraints on political agency two institutional factors emerged as crucial for 
Tea Party success: gerrymandering and primary rules favoring more extreme policy 
positions; and a ban on pork-barrel projects in appropriations bills that served as 
positive feedback for the emergent fiscal radicalism in the House.
57
  
As for the theoretical and empirical relevance of our findings, we have to keep 
in mind that crises may come in many forms. They are shaped by the nature of the 
leverage involved; by the might and structure of the opposition; by the extant rules 
within the institutional arena, and by the allies positioned without; as well as by the 
dynamics of a protracted period of contention. In this, all manufactured crises are 
unique.  
Yet this is not to say that all manufactured crises are unique in the sense that 
any attempt at generalization is futile. Quite the contrary, the case of the fiscal wars is 
significant in that it provides insight into the sub-type of endogenous crisis hallmarked 
by a disjointed collection of participants with partly overlapping aims. This is 
something to be expected in a separation-of-powers system powered by large sums of 
regulated and ‘dark’ money and partisan media operations. What is less trivial is that 
such a fragmented selection of players may nevertheless be adept at concocting, 
revising, and executing strategies over years. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this article, the logic of manufactured crisis was explored through outcome-centric 
research: our goal was to establish a causal link between independent political factors 
and dependent policy variables by way of a detailed description of the case at hand. 
The origins of the fiscal wars of 2011–2013 in the U.S. were assessed, and we put 
forth an explanation centered around the notion of manufactured crisis. The 
descriptive study of the factors at play pointed towards a shift in the political 
understanding of the debt ceiling.  
The ‘exemption consensus’ of the pre-2010s refers to a long series of debates 
and decisions related to the debt ceiling. Political brinkmanship played a minor role in 
these negotiations and no actors followed strategies explicitly aimed at defaulting on 
federal debt as a means of returning to fiscal restraint. The Tea Party template for 
exerting such a curtailment of deficit spending from an unwilling political 
establishment, therefore, constituted a new breed of crisis manufacturing. This sharp 
turn from debt-ceiling politics as usual was intentional, and it made use of the 
institutional and social setting of the early 2010s. Political entrepreneurs associated 
with the movement relied on a dynamic, coalition-based approach framed by outside 
pressure and steered by network governance. 
This case of ‘politics by hostage taking’ may be considered to be one of the best 
known instances of an endogenously and deliberately created policy crisis. As such, it 
also serves the purposes of theory development with regard to the role of political 
entrepreneurship in manufacturing policy crises. In conclusion, we consider how the 
logic presented in this study may be extended to cases beyond U.S. fiscal policy.  
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 ‘It’s made my job a lot more difficult,’ Boehner admitted. ‘I’ve got no grease.’ 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-the-republican-suicide-machine-20131009 
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First of all, it is also clear that the debt-ceiling case itself is worth further inquiry. 
It was not long after the fiscal wars that a new theme emerged linking climate change 
policies and funding for the Environmental Protection Agency to raising the debt 
ceiling.
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 Until congressional politics is ‘exempted’ from the debt limit, it is bound to 
produce new empirical flesh for the study of manufactured crises. 
Second, this point may apply to policy subsystems far removed from the 
domain of fiscal policy. In the U.S. the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to emergence of a 
surveillance state that in many respects outlasted the immediate threat of Al-Qaeda. 
According to the American Civil Liberties Union, the ‘Patriot Act,’ passed in 2001, 
‘amounted to an overnight revision of the nation's surveillance laws that vastly 
expanded the government's authority to spy on its own citizens, while simultaneously 
reducing checks and balances on those powers.’59 This interpretation was reinforced 
by Edward Snowden’s disclosures in 2013. Yet surrounding the debate about the need 
to ‘sunset’ certain provisions, a key force in the Senate, Lindsey Graham (R), stated 
that ‘anyone who neuters this program is going to be partially responsible for the next 
attack.’60 The temporal nature of the politics of manufactured crisis is clearly visible in 
this case, and in other related cases in which political entrepreneurship is aimed at 
sustaining the perception of a crisis situation for political gain.  
Third, this idea also travels well geographically: In Hungary, the topic of illegal 
migration became a key element in the messaging of Fidesz, the right-wing governing 
party, even as the flow of migrants approaching the Hungarian border all but stopped. 
However, this development did not lead to the government lifting the ‘state of 
emergency related to mass migration.’61  
A fourth aspect of the politics of manufactured crisis that has a relevance 
beyond the U.S. polity is associated with the severity of the potential repercussions of 
political entrepreneurship. Here, the key case appears to be Brexit, which – by 2019 – 
posed an existential challenge to the United Kingdom and Great Britain. The man-
made nature of this crisis situation is well-documented, from the role of former prime 
minister David Cameron to those associated with the social media and field campaign 
to leave the EU and beyond. 
Finally, the long-term dynamics of crisis manufacturing are also worth 
exploring, as these may shed light on crucial aspects beyond those that case studies 
can capture. Changing circumstances may lead to wholesale position shifts for the 
players involved. This is seen in how Barack Obama, then a junior senator from 
Illinois, argued on the Senate floor in 2006 that raising the debt limit was ‘a sign that 
the U.S. government can’t pay its own bills.’ As president, Obama admitted: ‘you start 
realizing (...) we can’t play around with this stuff.’62 Or, to cite a convert in the other 
direction: Mitch McConnell contemplated his short odds of becoming Senate 
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 http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/gop-senators-want-to-block-obamas-climate-rules 
59
https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/end-mass-surveillance-under-
patriot-act 
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https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/scaremongering-about-patriot-act-
sunset 
61
https://index.hu/belfold/2019/08/31/a_belugyminiszterium_szerint_meg_kell_hosszabbitani_a_tomeges_
bevandorlas_okozta_valsaghelyzetet/ 
62
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/04/president-barack-obama-exclusive-concedes-senate-vote-
against-raising-debt-limit-political/ 
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Majority Leader in August 2014 by claiming that Obama ‘needs to be challenged, and 
the best way to do that is through the funding process.’63 It takes a saint to withstand 
the lure of crisis manufacturing.  
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